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THE SUPREME COURT WADES THROUGH THE CLEAN
WATER ACT TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES THE
"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES"
Rapanos v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act ("CWA") 2 makes it illegal to backfill
"navigable waters" without a permit issued by the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). 3 "Navigable waters" is defined as the "waters of the
United States," including the territorial seas.4 The Corps, which is charged
with determining when a permit is required under the CWA, interprets the
"waters of the United States" expansively.s The Corps' changing
interpretation of the definition of the "waters of the United States," has
deliberately and continually expanded the definition of the "waters of the
United States."6
In Rapanos v. United States, the United States Supreme Court once
again addressed the definition of "navigable waters." 7 The Court held that
the definition includes (1) "only relatively permanent, standing or flowing
bodies of water, not intermittent or ephemeral flows of water, and (2) only
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are
waters of the United States in their own right are adjacent to such waters

' 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) [hereinafter "RapanosI'].
CWA is codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (2000).
' 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
4 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006).
5
id.
6RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. at 2216 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392
F. Supp. 685 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). "For a century prior to the CWA," "navigable waters"
was interpreted "to refer to [the] interstate waters that are 'navigable in fact' or readily
susceptible of being rendered so. After passage of the CWA, the Corps initially adopted
this traditional judicial definition for the Act's term 'navigable waters."' Id. (citations
omitted). However, after "a District Court enjoined [the definition] as too narrow" in
NaturalResources Defense Council, the Corps' established new regulations that "sought
to extend the definition." Id.
7
Id. at 2208.
2 The
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and covered by the CWA." 8 By limiting the definition of "navigable
waters," the United States Supreme Court has fulfilled the objective of the
CWA and curbed the economic costs of receiving a permit, which could
potentially allow for greater development and utilization of land. 9

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Plaintiff, John A. Rapanos, backfilled "a parcel of land in
Michigan that he owned and sought to develop."' 0 The Plaintiffs land
was located in Williams Township, Bay County, Michigan." His 175 acre
plot of land contained forested wetlands and cleared meadow areas. 12
In 1988, Rapanos sought to sell his plot of land to developers, and
began making plans to eliminate the vegetation and wetlands on his
property.' 3 Rapanos' lawyer contacted the Michigan Department of
Natural Resources to receive approval of the development plan. 14 The
Department notified Rapanos that he would need a permit before
beginning the backfilling of his land since his property included wetlands
protected under the CWA.15 Rapanos, disobeying both the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), began backfilling the wetlands on his property without a
permit.16 The United States brought civil enforcement proceedings against
Rapanos.17

8

id
Id at 2215.
10
Id. at 2214. The land Rapanos backfilled was "near ditches or man-made drains that
eventually empt[ied] into traditional navigable waters." Id. at 2211.
'1 United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter "Rapanos P].
121d at 448-49.
1 Id at 449. Rapanos sought to back-fill his land in order to make it more attractive to
rospective buyers. Id.
Id

1 Id Rapanos hired a consultant who issued a report that stated his land contained
between forty-nine and fifty-nine acres of wetlands. Id. "After receiving the report,
Rapanos asked the consultant to destroy any paper evidence of the wetlands on his
Froperty and then threatened to fire him and sue if he did not comply." Id.
Id.
" Id. at 447.
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The district court found in favor of Rapanos and held that his land
was "not 'directly adjacent to the navigable waters,"' and therefore, could
not be regulated by the CWA.1 The United States appealed the district
court's decision and filed for summary judgment. 19 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor
of the United States and determined that Rapanos' land was in fact within
the CWA's definition of "navigable waters" since the wetlands on his
parcel of land could potentially affect "navigable-in-fact-waters." 20 Based
on the Sixth Circuit's decision, Rapanos was required to request a permit
from the Corps, as required by the CWA, prior to backfilling the wetlands
on his parcel of land.2 '
Rapanos appealed the Sixth Circuit's decision to the United States
Supreme Court. 22 He admitted that the wetlands on his property had been
backfilled before he received a permit. 23 He asserted that his wetlands,
however, were "not subject to the [CWA] because of a lack of federal
Id. at 450 (quoting United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1015-16 (E.D.
Mich. 2002)).
19
Id.
20 Id. at 453. The CWA "defines 'navigable waters' as
'the waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas."' RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2211 (2006) (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)). "In the last three decades, [however,] the [Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps")] . .. have interpreted their jurisdiction over 'the waters of the United
States' to cover 270[-]300 million acres of swampy lands in the United States." Id. at
2215. "The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over virtually any parcel of land
containing a channel or conduit - whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow,
permanent or ephemeral - through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or
intermittently flow." Id. Given the broad definition and interpretation adopted by the
Corps, the Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals held that Rapanos'
"wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase
'navigable waters', if the wetlands, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands
in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other
covered waters understood as navigable in the traditional senses." Id. at 2213.
21 Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2214-15. The CWA authorizes the Administrator
of the EPA
to issue a permit for the discharge of a pollutant as defined by 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Id. at
2215. "Section 1344 authorizes the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Corps, to
'issue permits . .. for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at
S
disposal sites."' Id. at 2215-16 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d)).
Secified
Id at 2208.
23
Id. at 2214-15.
1

373

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No. 2
jurisdiction."24 Rapanos argued a lack of federal jurisdiction on the basis
that his land was not a part of the "waters of the United States" as stated
and required by the CWA.25 He specifically pointed to the district court's
determination that the wetlands on his land were not directly connected to
"waters of the United States." 26
The United States argued that "restrictions on the [definition] of
'navigable waters' will frustrate enforcement against traditional water
polluters . .. [as] water polluters will be able to evade the . .. requirement
[of a permit] . . . simply by discharging their pollutants into noncovered

intermittent watercourses that lie upstream of [waters covered by the
CWA]." 2 7 Furthermore, the United States contended that a "narrower
interpretation of [the waters of the United States] will impose a more
difficult burden of proof in enforcement proceedings . . . by requiring the
[EPA] to demonstrate the . . . flow of the pollutant along the intermittent

channel to traditional 'waters."' 28
The Supreme Court held 29 that the Corps' interpretation and
definition of "waters of the United States" was too expansive and that the
meaning of "waters of the United States" refers more narrowly to "water
as found in streams and bodies forming geographical features." 30
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the term "navigable waters"
under the CWA includes only "relatively permanent, standing or flowing
bodies of water, not intermittent or ephemeral flows of water." 3 ' In
24

RapanosI, 339 F.3d at 449.

25 id.
26

1d. at 450.
RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. at 2227.
28
d
29 The Supreme Court consolidated the Rapanos case with Carabell v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004). Id. at 2208. In Carabell,the
Plaintiffs were denied a permit to "fill in a wetland that was separated from a drainage
ditch by an impermeable berm." Id. at 2211. The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the
Corps; however the District Court found federal jurisdiction over the land. Id Given the
27

need to determine the CWA's jurisdiction over wetlands in order to resolve both cases,
the Supreme Court accordingly consolidated Rapanos and Carabell. Id. at 2220.
30
Id. at 2220 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).
31 Id. at 2222.
The restriction of "the waters of the United States" to exclude channels
containing merely intermittent or ephemeral flow also accords with the
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addition, the Court found that only those wetlands with a "continuous
surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' on their
own are adjacent to the waters and covered by the CWA." 32 Therefore,
since Rapanos' wetlands did not have a direct and continuous surface
connection to the "waters of the United States," he was not required to
obtain a permit before backfilling his land. Consequently, the Supreme
Court vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision and remanded the case. 34

III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Clean Water Act 35
The objective of the CWA is to restore and maintain the "chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."36 The CWA also
strives to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
commonsense understanding of the term. In applying the definition to
"ephemeral streams," "wet meadows," storm sewers and culverts,
"directional sheet flow during storm events," drain tiles, man-made
drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of the desert, the Corps
has stretched the term "waters of the United States" beyond parody....
In addition, the [CWA]'s use of the traditional phrase "navigable
waters" further confirms that it confers jurisdiction only over relatively
permanent bodies of water.
Id. (emphasis omitted). "The phrase 'waters of the United States' includes only those
relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water 'forming
geographic features' that are described in ordinary parlance as 'streams[,] ... oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes."' Id. at 2225.
32 Id. at 2226. "Only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that
are 'waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation
between 'waters' and wetlands, are 'adjacent to' such waters and are covered by the
[CWA]." Id. (emphasis omitted). Therefore, two findings are required to establish that
wetlands, such as those at the Rapanos site, are covered by the Act. Id. at 2227. "First. .
. the adjacent channel [must contain] a 'water of the United States,' (i.e., a relatively
permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters)." Id.
Second, the wetland must have "a continuous surface connection with that water, making
it difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins." Id.
SId.
34

3s
3

Id. at 2208.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
Id. § 1251(a).
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rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the
Administrator [of the EPA] in the exercise of his authority." 37
In addition, the CWA explicitly makes it unlawful to discharge
dredge or fill material, without a permit, into navigable waters in order to
preserve the waters of our nation.3 8 The term navigable waters, as briefly
defined by the CWA, are "waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 39 The CWA does not provide any further definitions or
clarity as to the appropriate interpretation of the "waters of the United
States;" however it does define territorial seas as "the belt of the seas
measured from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the
coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the
seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a distance of three
miles."4 0
The CWA prescribes authority to the Corps to issue permits for
backfilling navigable waters. 4 1 The CWA assigned the task of issuing
permits to the Corps and the Corps developed regulations to more
specifically identify what constitutes the "waters of the United States" in
order to determine when a permit is required.4 2
The Supreme Court has previously stated that an agency's
construction of a statute, which it has been given authority to enforce,
should be given deference if the construction is reasonable and is not
inconsistent with the intent of Congress. 4 3 Therefore, the Court's review
in disputes involving the determination of the "waters of the United
States" is limited to the reasonableness of whether the Corps may exercise

§ 1251(b).
See id. §§ 1251(b), 1342, & 1344.
39
1d. § 1362(7).
40Id. § 1362(8).
41 See id. § 1344. "The term 'Secretary' as used in this section means the Secretary of the
Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers." Id. "The Secretary may issue permits,
after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites." Id § 1344(a).
42 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006).
43 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (citing
Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. NaturalRes. Def Council,Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985))
[hereinafter "RiversideBayview"].
37

1d.

31
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jurisdiction, given the "language, policies, and legislative history" of the
CWA over the lands in question."
B. The Corps Definition of the "Waters of the United States"
The Corps developed regulations that specify the
"waters of the United States," as the term relates to the need
to backfill land to "provide clarity and avoid confusion with
of Engineer regulatory programs." 4 5 A sub-section of
regulation is as follows:
(a)

meaning of
for a permit
other Corps
the Corp's

The term "waters of the United States" means
(1)
All waters which are currently used, or were
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use
in interstate or foreign commerce, including
all waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide;
(2)

All interstate waters including interstate
wetlands;

(3)

All other waters such as intrastate lakes,
rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate or foreign commerce
including any such waters:

"4RiversideBayview, 474 U.S. at 131.
33 C.F.R. § 328.1. "This section defines the term 'waters
of the United States' as it
applies to the jurisdictional limits of the authority of the Corps of Engineers under the
[CWA]." Id. "It prescribes the policy, practice, and procedures to be used in determining
the extent ofjurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers concerning 'waters of the United
States."' Id.
45
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(i)
(ii)

(iii)

(7)

Which are or could be used by
interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
From which fish or shellfish are
or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce;
or
Which are used or could be used
by
purpose
for industrial
industries in interstate commerce;

Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than
waters that are themselves wetlands)
identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(6) of this
section.
including
systems,
treatment
Waste
treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet
the requirements of CWA (other than
cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR
423.11(m) which also meet the criteria of
this definition) are not waters of the United
States.

(b)

The term "wetlands" means those areas that are
inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at
a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
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(c)

The term "adjacent" means bordering, contiguous,
or neighboring. Wetlands separated from other
waters of the United States by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the
like are "adjacent wetlands."4 6

The paragraphs of the Corps' definition most relevant to the
Rapanos case are in sections 328.3(a)(2), (a)(7), (b), and (c). 4 7 The Corps'
interpretation of these paragraphs determines whether or not wetlands are
protected by the CWA and fall within the Corps' jurisdiction to require
permits prior to the backfilling of dredge materials.4 8 However, when
litigation ensues, it is ultimately the court's interpretation as to when a
permit is required that prevails.
The Corps' interpretation of the "waters of the United States" has
evolved over time and has increased in scope. 4 9 The increasingly
expansive interpretation of the "waters of the United States" has fueled
debates as to whether the Corps' authority is too far-reaching, as seen in
the Court's decision in Rapanos.50
C. UnitedStates Supreme Court's Interpretationof "Waters of the United
States"
1. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 5 1
In 1985, the Court presided over a dispute between the United
States ("the Corps") and Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. ("Riverside
Bayview").5 2 The dispute arose when Riverside Bayview backfilled its

33 C.F.R. § 328.3.
47 Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2216 (2006).
46
48

49

d

Id. at 2216-17.

50

Id. at 2208; See also Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. Anny Corps ofEngineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter
"SWANCC"].
52 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Id at 124.
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property near the shores of Lake St. Clair, Michigan. 53 The Corps asserted
that Riverside Bayview's property were wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters, and therefore covered by the CWA, which required a permit
before the property was backfilled. 54 The district court found for the
Corps, but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that
the Corps' authority under the CWA must be narrowly construed.5 5
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals
decision and held that the "language, policies, and history of the CWA"
compel a finding that the Corps' interpretation of the "waters of the United
States" to include wetlands that were adjacent to navigable waters was in
fact appropriate for the purpose of determining whether a permit was
required prior to backfilling one's land under the CWA. The Court
further acknowledged that the Corps' authority under the CWA extends
"to all wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their
tributaries." 57
The Court defined the wetlands in question as "inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient
to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions,"5 and
stated that the wetlands in question were adjacent to a navigable waterway
as required.59 In addition, the Court did not find reason to interpret the
Corps' regulation more narrowly than its terms would indicate, thereby

54 id

Id. at 125-26. The court of appeals further stated that Corps' authority must be
narrowly construed to "avoid a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 126.
5
6 Id. The Court stated that the primary question of whether the Corps may demand that
Riverside Bayview Homes obtain a permit before filling its wetlands was "primarily one
of regulatory and statutory interpretation: [the Court had to] determine whether
[Riverside Bayview Homes'] property [was] an 'adjacent wetland' within the meaning of
the applicable regulation, and, if so, whether the Corps' jurisdiction over 'navigable
waters' gave it statutory authority to regulate discharges of fill material into such a
wetland." Id.
5 Id. at 129.
58
Id. (emphasis omitted).
s9 Id. at 131.
5
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following Congress' action in 1977 to maintain the broad jurisdiction of
the Corps. 60
In 1977, Congress was faced with the challenge of either
narrowing or maintaining the current jurisdiction of the Corps. 6 1
Ultimately, Congress upheld the Corps' rather expansive jurisdiction for
two reasons.62 First, Congress was "concern[ed] that [the] protection of
wetlands would be unduly hampered by a narrowed definition of
'navigable waters."' 63 Second, Congress noted that those who would have
restricted the Corps' jurisdiction would have done so "only by restricting
the scope of 'navigable waters'

adjacent

. . .

to waters navigable in fact and their

wetlands." 64

60

Id. at 135. "Following promulgation of the Corps' interim final regulations in 1975,
the Corps' assertion of authority under section 404 over waters not actually navigable
engendered some congressional opposition." Id In both the House and Senate, the
debate to narrow the definition of navigable waters centered specifically on wetlands. Id.
at 136. Proponents of a more limited jurisdiction for the Corps asserted that the Corps'
definition of "waters of the United States" far exceeded what Congress had intended
when the CWA was enacted. Id. Opponents of the proposed changes asserted that
limiting the definition of the "waters of the United States" would jeopardize wetland
ecosystems, water quality, and aquatic environment in general. Id. In resolution, efforts
to narrow the definition of the "waters of the United States" were abandoned and the
Corps' broad jurisdiction was maintained. Id. at 137.
61See id. at 136.
62
Id. at 138.
" Id. at 137. "[A] refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of legislation
is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that construction, particularly where the
administrative construction has been brought to Congress' attention through legislation
s ecifically designed to supplant it." Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Thus, even those who thought that the Corps' existing authority under
[section] 404 was too broad recognized (1) that the definition of
'navigable waters' then in force for both [section] 301 and [section] 404
was reasonably interpreted to include adjacent wetlands, (2) that the
water quality concerns of the Clean Water Act demanded regulation of
at least some discharges into wetlands, and (3) that whatever
jurisdiction the Corps would retain over discharges of fill material after
passage of the 1977 legislation should extend to discharges into
wetlands adjacent to any waters over which the Corps retained
jurisdiction.
Id. at 138.
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The Court in Riverside Bayview maintained consistency with
Congress' 1977 interpretation of the Corps' statute.65 Accordingly, the
Court interpreted the Corps' statute to include the wetlands found on
Riverside Bayview's property since (1) the wetlands were adjacent to a
navigable waterway and (2) had "saturated soil conditions and wetland
vegetation [that] extended beyond the boundary of respondent's [Riverside
Bayview's] property to a navigable waterway." 66
2. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army Corps of
Engineers6 7
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC") was
a group of 23 suburban Chicago cities and towns that "united in an effort
to locate and develop a disposal site for baled non-hazardous solid
waste." 68 SWANCC located and purchased a 533 acre parcel of land that
had been used as a sand and gravel xit by a mining operation for
approximately three decades until 1960. The sand and gravel pit, after
being abandoned, eventually formed a "successional stage forest ... and a
scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of varying size . . . and

depth." 70 Before backfilling the land, SWANCC contacted the Corps to
determine if a permit was required under the CWA.n
The Corps originally concluded it did not have jurisdiction over the
land in question, as the site did not contain wetlands "or areas which
support 'vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions." 2 However, the Corps changed its determination "after the
Illinois Nature Preserves Commission informed the Corps that a number

65 See generally Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S.
121.

Id at 131. The Court did not express an opinion as to whether the Corps has
the
authority to regulate the discharge of dredge or fill material into wetlands that are not
66

adjacent to navigable waterways. SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
531 U.S. 159 (2001).

67
6

1Id. at 162-63.

69

70
72

Id. at 163.
id.
Id. at 164 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2006).
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of migratory bird species had been observed at the site." 73 The Corps then
ruled it in fact had jurisdiction over the land in question pursuant to the
Migratory Bird Rule,7 4 which expanded the Corps' authority over those
lands that are not necessarily connected to the "waters of the Untied
States."7 Based on the Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps did not issue
SWANCC a permit to backfill its land.76
73id

The Corps found that approximately 121 bird species had been
observed at the site, including several known to depend upon aquatic
environments for a significant portion of their life requirements. Thus,
on November 16, 1987, the Corps formally 'determined that the
seasonally ponded, abandoned gravel mining depressions located on the
project site, while not wetlands, did qualify as 'waters of the United
States' . . . based upon the following criteria: (1) the proposed site had

been abandoned as a gravel mining operation; (2) the water areas and
spoil piles had developed a natural character; and (3) the water areas are
used as habitat by migratory bird [sic] which cross state lines.'
Id. at 164-65.
74

Id. at 164.
In 1986, in an attempt to 'clarify' the reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps
stated that [section] 404(a) extends to intrastate waters: (a) which are
or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties; or (b) where are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds which cross state lines; or (c) which are or would be
used as habitat for endangered species; or (d) used to irrigate crops sold
in interstate commerce.

Id
7
1Id. at 164-65.
7 Id. at 165. SWANCC made several attempts to mitigate the damage to migratory
birds
and in 1993 finally received a landfill development permit from the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency. Id Despite receiving a permit from the Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps refused to grant a permit under the CWA.
Id.
The Corps found that SWANCC had not established that its proposal
was the "least environmentally damaging, most practicable alternative"
for disposal of non-hazardous solid waste; [and] that SWANCC [did
not] set aside sufficient funds to fix any potential leaks thereby posed
"unacceptable risk to the public's drinking water supply[;"] and that
impact of the project upon area-sensitive species was unmitigatable
since a landfill surface cannot be redeveloped into a forested habitat.
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SWANCC filed suit against the Corps challenging the Corps'
jurisdiction, specifically the use of the Migratory Bird Rule, and the
validity of its denial to issue a permit under the CWA. 77 The district court
granted the Corps' motion for summary judgment on the jurisdictional
issue and SWANCC dropped its challenge over the Corps' permit
refusal. 8 SWANCC appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and asserted that the Corps
had "exceeded [its] statutory authority in interpreting the CWA to cover
nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters based [on] the presence of
migratory birds." 79 The court of appeals held that because the "aggregate
effect of the 'destruction of the natural habitat of migratory birds' on
interstate commerce . . . [would be] substantial[, as] each year millions of

Americans cross state lines and spend over a billion dollars to hunt and
observe migratory birds," the Corps' interpretation of the CWA and
prescribed jurisdiction was not over-reaching. o
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of
appeals decision by holding that the Migratory Bird Rule is not fairly
supported by the CWA.8 1 The Court concluded that the Corps' original
interpretation of the CWA was inconsistent with its interpretation in this
case. 82 Furthermore, the Court found the Corps' argument that Congress
was aware of its expansive interpretation, to include those waters or lands
that did not have a nexus to defined navigable waters during its 1977

77
78

id.
id.

Id. at 165-66. SWANCC also argued "in the alternative' that Congress lacked the
power under the Commerce Clause to grant such regulatory jurisdiction." Id. at 166.
oId. at 166. The court of appeals also determined that Congress does in fact have the
authority to regulate waters "based [on] 'the cumulative impact doctrine, under which a
single activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may still be
regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on
interstate commerce."' Id.
7

8 Id. at
82

166-68.

Id at 168. In 1974, the Corps' regulation defined navigable waters "to mean 'those
waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are
presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for
purposes of interstate or foreign commerce."' Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1)
(2006)).
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amendments to the CWA, failed. The Court held that it cannot be
assumed that Congress acquiesced to the Corps' expansive interpretation
simply because Congress did not enact legislation that would have
restricted the Corps' authority. 84
Additionally, the Court held that "[p]ermitting [the Corps] to claim
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory
Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use," which is in direct
opposition to the purpose of the CWA.ss After performing a thorough
analysis of the history and intent of the CWA, the Court held that the
Migratory Bird Rule exceeded the authority granted to the Corps under the
CWA, and thus, SWANCC was not required to obtain a permit from the
Corps prior to backfilling its' land.

8

1 d at 168-70.

Id. at 170. The Court states that "[a]lthough we have recognized congressional
acquiescence to administrative interpretations of a statute in some situations, we have
done so with extreme care." Id. at 169. Moreover, "'failed legislative proposals are "a
particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute."' Id
at 169-70 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)). The Court also supports its decision by stating that "[w]here
an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power,
we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result." Id. at 683 (citing
EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. FloridaGulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
81Id. at 174.
Rather than expressing a desire to readjust the federal-state balance .
Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
8

and rights of States . .. to plan the development and use . . . of land and water

resources . . . ." "The Court will read the statute as written to avoid the
significant constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps']
interpretation, and therefore [this Court] reject[s] the [Corps'] request for
administrative deference.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)).
86
Id. at 174. The main argument underlying the dissent (by four justices) is that "because
of the [CWA's] ambitious and comprehensive goals, it is necessary to expend the Corps'
authority (jurisdictional scope) to include the Migratory Bird Rule. Id. at 687.

385

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No. 2
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Plurality Opinion
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion, in Rapanos, explicitly
stated that the Corps' expansive approach to define "waters of the United
States" is not consistent with the objective of the CWA. The plurality
further stated that the use of the article "the" and the plurality of "waters"
establish that "waters of the United States" does not refer to water in
general terms; therefore the definition must be interpreted strictly.89 In
addition, "[t]he restriction of the "waters of the United States" to exclude
channels containing merely intermittent or ephemeral flow is consistent
with the" general usage and understanding of the term "waters." 90 The
Court found that the CWA's "use of the traditional phrase 'navigable
waters"' further bolsters the Court's decision that the Corps' jurisdiction
should be limited to only "relatively permanent bodies of water." 9 1
Furthermore, the plurality stated that the restricted definition of the
"waters of the United States" is congruent with "the CWA's policy to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
the [s]tates to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, and to plan the

8 The plurality of the court was comprised of Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ. Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214. Scalia, J., filed the opinion of the Court, in
which Roberts, C.J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ. joined. Id. Roberts, C.J., filed a separate
concurrence, id. at 2235, and Kennedy, J., filed a concurrence in the judgment. Id at
2236. The dissenting justices were Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, JJ. Id. at
2252. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Id. Breyer, J., also filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 2266.
88
Id. at 2216. "The Corps' new regulations deliberately sought to extend the definition
of 'the waters of the United States' to the outer limits of Congress' commerce power."
Id.
" Id. at 2220. "'[T]he waters' refers more narrowly to water as found in streams and
bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, and lakes, or the 'flowing or
moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies."' Id. "All of
theses terms connote continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily
dry channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flows." Id. at 2221.

9 Id. at 2222.
91 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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development and use of land and water resources." 92 The plurality
contended that the phrase "waters of the United States" can have only one
plausible interpretation - "permanent, standing or continuously flowing
bodies of water "forming geographic features" that are described in
ordinary parlance." 93
The plurality also acknowledged the difficulty of including
wetlands as a subset of "waters of the United States." 94 Therefore, the
plurality held that only "those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own
right, so that there is no clear demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands,
are 'adjacent to' such waters and covered by the CWA." 95
Upon analysis of the meaning and appropriate definition of
"navigable waters" as stated in the CWA, the plurality held that the
current interpretation of "navigable waters" by the Corps is too broad and

92

Id. at 2223. The broad definition adopted by the Corps, would essentially bring 'all
plan[ning of] the development and use . .. of land and water resources' by the States
under federal control." Id. at 2224. "The broad definition of "the waters of the United
States" would authorize the Corps to function as a defacto regulator of immense
stretches of intrastate land; which would allow unprecedented intrusion into traditional
state authority." Id.
9 Id. at 2225. The phrase "'the waters of the United States' includes streams, oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes, (as defined by Webster's New International Dictionary 2882 (2d ed.)),
and does not include channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally,
or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall." Id.
94 Id.

The Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and
land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy
task: the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even
typically an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may
lay shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs - in short, a huge array
of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of
being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the limit of 'waters' is

far from obvious.
Id. Faced with this difficulty the Court held in Riverside Bayview "that a wetland that
'adjoined' waters of the United States is itself a part of those waters." Id.
9
Id. at 2226 (emphasis omitted). Wetlands without a constant connection and therefore
with only a "physically remote hydrologic connection to 'waters of the United States' . . .
lack the necessary connection to [the] covered waters" protected under the CWA. Id.
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therefore vacated the jud
for further proceedings. 9

ent of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case

B. The Dissent
The dissenting justices argued the judiciary should give deference
to the Corps' interpretation of what constitutes "waters of the United
States;" 97 since it is the responsibility and expectation of the judiciary to
"respect the work product of the Legislative and Executive [b]ranches of .
. . [g]ovemment." 98 In addition, the dissenting justices noted the Court's
unanimous opinion in Riverside Bayview. 99 In Riverside Bayview, the
Court framed the issue as "whether the [CWA] 'authorizes the Corps to
require landowners to obtain permits . . . before discharging fill material

into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries;"
not whether the Corps has jurisdiction "over 'wetlands that are not
96

Id. at 2235. Roberts, C.J., filed a concurrence opinion, which simply reiterated to the
Corps that its authority is not limitless, as was mentioned previously in SWANCC. Id
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). Roberts, C.J., states, "rather than refining its [Corps'] view
of its authority in light of our decision in SWANCC, . . . the Corps chose to adhere to its
essentially boundless view of the scope of its power. The upshot today is another defeat
for the agency." Id. at 2236. Finally Roberts, C.J., concludes that the definition of "the
waters of the United States" must be interpreted to meet the objective of the CWA. Id. at
2235. Kennedy, J., concurred in the judgment and stated that this case needs to be
remanded in order for there to be a determination if the term "navigable waters" as stated
in the CWA" extends to wetlands that do not contain and are not adjacent to waters that
are navigable in fact." Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Army Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries of
traditionally navigable waters preserve the quality of our Nation's
waters by, among other things, providing habitat for aquatic animals,
keeping excessive sediment and toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters,
and reducing downstream flooding by absorbing water at times of high
flow. The Corps' resulting decision to treat these wetlands as
encompassed within the term "waters of the United States" is a
quintessential example of the Executive's reasonable interpretation of a
statutory provision.

Id.
98 Id. at 2253.
99

Id. at 2255.
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adjacent to bodies of open water."' 00 Therefore, the Corps' jurisdiction
and authority over whether particular wetlands constitute "waters of the
United States" was not disturbed by the Court. In addition, the dissenting
Rapanos justices mentioned that in 1977 Congress decided not to narrow
the Corps' jurisdiction, and thus deference should be given to Congress'
decision. 101
Furthermore, the dissenting Rapanos justices pointed to the fact
that the plurality failed to provide a clear definition as to what is
considered intermittent versus relatively permanent waters, and therefore,
they convolute the determination of "waters of the United States," as they
are essentially leaving "litigants without guidance as to where the line [is
drawn.]"l 02 Most importantly, the dissenting justices concluded by stating
that the
lurality "disregards the fundamental significance of the
[CWA]." 3 The CWA is "not merely another law," but was "viewed by
Congress as a [complete overhaul] of the [then] existing water pollution
legislation.""
The justices further acknowledged that due to the
uncertainty in defining "waters of the United States," a broad definition,
and jurisdiction by the Corps should be adopted as it would advance the
interests of the CWA. 0 5
Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2255 & 2255 n.3 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. 121,
131-32 (1985)).

1

101Id.

at 2256.

[C]oncerns about the appropriateness of the Corps' 30-year
implementation of the [CWA] should be addressed to Congress or the
Corps rather than to the Judiciary. Whether the benefits of particular
conservation measures outweigh their costs is a classic question of
public policy that should not be answered by appointed judges.
Id. at 2259.
[T]he plurality disregards the fundamental significance of the [CWA] . .
. . "Congress' intent in enacting the [CWA] was clearly to establish an
all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation," and "the
most casual perusal of the legislative history demonstrates that . . .
views on the comprehensive nature of the legislation were practically
universal."
Id. at 2262 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,318 (1981)).
102
Id. at 2260 n.10.
03
1 Id at 2262.
104 id
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V. COMMENT
In interpreting the intent and jurisdiction of a legislative act, the
Court should defer to past rulings, construe the meaning of the act in a
practical and easily applicable manner, and ensure that the rights
preserved within the act are not impinged in order to allow for sound and
logical judgments. The Rapanos plurality determined the Corps'
interpretation of the "waters of the United States" was too expansive.106
The Court reached its decision by analyzing the precise language used in
the construction of the CWA and the traditional meaning of the words
used, and reviewing prior court rulings in relation to the dispute at
hand.10 7 In addition, the Court utilized common-sense notions and
reviewed the practicalities of the definition and the jurisdiction of the
Corps.s0 8 Finally, the plurality recognized that the states have 'traditional
and primary power over land and water use."' 1 09 The plurality's approach
to understanding the CWA and the rationale for its decision is clear,
sound, just, and practical.
Private property rights, in order to protect landowners from
abusive government conduct, are perhaps the most important rights
protected by our nation's laws."l0 By limiting the Corps' jurisdiction and
The Act has largely succeeded in restoring the quality of our Nation's
waters. Where the Cuyahoga River was once coated with industrial
waste, "[t]oday, that location is lined with restaurants and pleasure boat
slips." By curtailing the Corps' jurisdiction of more than 30 years, the
plurality needlessly jeopardizes the quality of our waters. In doing so,
the plurality disregards the deference it owes the Executive, the
congressional acquiescence in the Executive's position that we
recognized in Riverside Bayview, and its own obligation to interpret
laws rather than to make them.
Id. at 2265 (citations omitted).
1o6 Id. at 2208.
107 See generally Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. 2208
(2006).
0
1 8 id.
1" Id at 2224 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)).
110 Interpreting the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in the joint cases of
Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on "The Waters
of the United States", United States Senate - Environment and Public Works Committee,
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water, (Aug. 1, 2006) (testimony of Keith
Kisling, on behalf of National Association of Wheat Growers National Cattlemen's Beef
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providing greater meaning to the intent of the CWA, the Court has
provided a 'rule' that the people of the United States can utilize in
determining what portions of their land may be protected and under
government control."' Both "overzealous government regulation and the
failure to provide adequate notice about the extent of authority to regulate
[land] result[s] in [the] serious infringement of the rights" of
landowners.112 Though many landowners "understand the government can
and should regulate private conduct in certain carefully prescribed
instances," there is an expectation that in the United States it will be done
in accordance with the law." 3 The Court's decision in Rapanos provides
more clarity as to how far the Corps' jurisdiction will reach, and limits the
Corps' jurisdiction according to the intent of the CWA.
The dissenting justices provide deference to the Corps, as it is the
regulatory body given the authority to determine what constitutes the
"waters of the United States."ll 4 They argue that the Corps' expansive
interpretation should be upheld."t 5 Though deference ought to be given to
the Corps' interpretation of "waters of the United States," it is important to
recognize that it is the judiciary's responsibility to provide oversight and
ensure that jurisdictional authority provided in a legislative act is not
overreached. If the Corps' interpretation were upheld based on deference,
the question then arises - at what point does the Corps' jurisdictional reach
extend beyond that of legislative intent?
A tangential and relevant issue that arises from Rapanos is the cost
of CWA permits and the economic impact of development in comparison
to the preservation of our aquatic lands and species. The National
Association of Home Builders ("NAHB") estimates that housing
developers pay on average $312,298 per site to comply with CWA permit
fees and requirements, which is an estimated increase in housing costs of
$1,400 to $7,000 per unit.11 6 An increase in the cost to develop land
Association). People want to have the freedom to use their property as they would like.

Id.
i'

Id.

112

d

113

id.

114 Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2252.
" Id. at 2253.
"6 Rhonda Jackson, Cleaning Up the Clean WaterAct, PROF.
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including building homes and industrial and commercial buildings could
potentially lead to less development and growth of our economy. Thus, if
the Corps' jurisdiction over the "waters of the United States" is expanded,
this could have a stifling affect on the growth of our cities and towns.
However, the impact on development must be compared to the impact on
our lands and aquatic species.
Though preserving our lands and aquatic species is a concern and
one of the objectives of the CWA, the freedom of the Corps to interpret
(and expand) the definition of the "waters of the United States", is
potentially a far greater concern. If the Corps is given unbridled authority,
this creates the potential for inconsistent decisions made by the Corps,
makes it difficult for land owners to determine when a permit is necessary,
and does not allow for judicial oversight (checks and balances) as a
standard to determine accuracy. Furthermore, the intent of the legislature,
when enacting the CWA, will no longer be significant; which is contrary
to our system of enacting and enforcing laws based on the Congress'
intent and purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court completed a
thorough analysis of the CWA.1 17 The Court acknowledged (and
encompassed within its decision) the legislature's intent when drafting the
CWA, the precise meaning of the words used within the CWA, and the
difficulty of "line drawing" in determining what constitutes the "waters of
the United States." The final decision ultimately calls for jurisdictional
limitations to be placed on the Corps based on the purpose and intent of
the CWA. Additionally, the final decision provides for greater clarity for
property owners to determine what portion of their land may be protected
by the CWA and regulated by the Corps.
LAKSHMI LAKSHMANAN

117

See generally Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. 2208.

392

